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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate Rosser provability predicates whose
provability logics are normal modal logics. First, we prove that there
exists a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic is exactly
the normal modal logic KD. Secondly, we introduce a new normal
modal logic KDR which is a proper extension of KD, and prove that
there exists a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic in-
cludes KDR.
1 Introduction
In the paper [10], we raised the problem of the existence of a Σ2 rep-
resentation of each theory T such that the provability logic of the con-
ventional provability predicate constructed from this representation is
exactly the modal logic KD = K + ¬⊥. This problem has not been
settled yet. Here we consider the following more general question: Is
there a provability predicate whose provability logic is exactly KD? In
this paper, we give an affirmative answer to this problem by considering
Rosser provability predicates.
Let T be any consistent recursively enumerable extension of Peano
Arithmetic PA. We say a formula PrT (x) is a provability predicate of
T if it weakly represents the set of all theorems of T in PA, that is,
for any natural number n, PA ⊢ PrT (n) if and only if n is the Go¨del
number of some theorem of T . An arithmetical interpretation based on
PrT (x) is a mapping f from modal formulas to sentences of arithmetic
such that f commutes with every propositional connective and f maps
 to PrT (x). Let PL(PrT ) be the set of all modal formulas A such
that T ⊢ f(A) for each arithmetical interpretation f based on PrT (x).
This set is called the provability logic of PrT (x). Solovay [19] proved
that for each standard Σ1 provability predicate PrT (x) of T , if T is
Σ1-sound, then the provability logic of PrT (x) is equal to the modal
logic GL. This is Solovay’s arithmetical completeness theorem.
On the other hand, Feferman [4] found a Π1 representation of a the-
ory T such that PA proves the consistency statement for the provability
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predicate PrFT (x) constructed from this representation. The provabil-
ity logic PL(PrFT ) of Feferman’s predicate includes the modal logic KD,
and it is completely different from GL. The problem of exact axioma-
tization of PL(PrFT ) was studied by Montagna [12] and Visser [20], but
it has not been settled yet. Shavrukov [17] found a Feferman-like Σ2
provability predicate whose provability logic is exactly the modal logic
KD+p→ ((q → q) ∨p).
Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) was essentially introduced by
Rosser [14] to improve Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem. It is
well-known that the consistency statement for PrRT (x) is provable in
PA. Then by the proof of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, at
least one of the principles (K): (p → q) → (p → q) and (4):
p → p is invalid for each Rosser provability predicate (Whether
the principle (K) is valid for Rosser provability predicates was asked by
Kreisel and Takeuti [8]). Actually, Guaspari and Solovay [5] and Arai
[1] showed that whether (K) or (4) is invalid for PrRT (x) depends on
the choice of PrRT (x). More precisely, by using the modal logical result
of Guaspari and Solovay, it can be shown that there exists a Rosser
provability predicate for which neither of these principles is valid. Also
Arai proved the existence of a Rosser provability predicate satisfying
(K) and a Rosser provability predicate satisfying (4).
Modal logical investigations of Rosser provability predicates were
initiated by Guaspari and Solovay, and continued by Visser [20], Shavrukov
[16] and others. In particular, Shavrukov introduced the bimodal logic
GR for usual provability and Rosser provability, and proved the arith-
metical completeness theorem for GR. Although Shavrukov’s arith-
metically complete logic GR does not contain (K) for the modality of
Rosser provability as an axiom, it is worth considering (K) for Rosser
provability from modal logical viewpoint. That is, it is easy to show
that the provability logic PL(PrRT ) is a normal modal logic if and only
if (K) is valid for PrRT (x). If PL(Pr
R
T ) is normal, then PL(Pr
R
T ) includes
KD.
In this paper, we investigate Rosser provability predicates whose
provability logics are normal. In Section 3, we give an affirmative
answer to the problem raised in the first paragraph of this section, that
is, we prove that there exists a Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) of T
such that PL(PrRT ) is exactly KD. In Section 4, we introduce and study
a new normal modal logic KDR = KD+¬p→ ¬p. In particular,
we prove that there exists a Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) of
T such that KDR ⊆ PL(PrRT ). Thus we obtain a Rosser provability
predicate whose provability logic is a proper extension of KD. Whether
there exists a Rosser provability predicate whose provability logic is
exactly KDR is still open.
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2 Preliminaries
The axioms of the modal logic K are all propositional tautologies in
the language of propositional modal logic and the formula (p→ q)→
(p→ q). The inference rules for K are modus ponens, necessitation
and substitution. Each modal logic L is identified with the set of all
theorems of L. We say a modal logic L is normal if K ⊆ L and L is
closed under modus ponens, necessitation and substitution. For any
modal logic L and modal formula A, let L+A denote the least normal
modal logic whose axioms are those of L and the formula A. Several
normal modal logics are obtained by adding axioms to K as follows
(see [2, 3] for more details):
1. KD = K+ ¬⊥.
2. T = K+p→ p.
3. KD4 = KD+p→ p.
4. KD5 = KD+ ¬p→ ¬p.
5. GL = K+(p→ p)→ p.
A Kripke frame is a tuple (W,≺) where W is a nonempty set and
≺ is a binary relation on W . A Kripke model is a tuple M = (W,≺,)
where (W,≺) is a Kripke frame, and  is a binary relation between
W and the set of all modal formulas satisfying the usual propositional
conditions for satisfaction and the following condition: x  A if and
only if for all y ∈ W , y  A if x ≺ y. We say a modal formula A is
valid in a Kripke model M = (W,≺,) if for all w ∈ W , w  A. We
say that M is finite if W is finite. Also we say that M is serial if for
any x ∈W , there exists y ∈ W such that x ≺ y.
It is known that the modal logic KD is sound and complete with
respect to the class of all finite serial Kripke models. Moreover, the
following theorem holds.
Theorem 2.1 (Kripke completeness theorem for KD (see [13])). For
each modal formula A which is not provable in KD, we can primitive
recursively find a finite serial Kripke model in which A is not valid.
Throughout this paper, we assume that T always denotes a recur-
sively enumerable consistent extension of Peano Arithmetic PA in the
language LA of first-order arithmetic. Let ω be the set of all natural
numbers. For each n ∈ ω, the numeral for n is denoted by n. We
fix a natural Go¨del numbering such that 0 is not a Go¨del number of
any object, and that Go¨del numbers of terms and formulas in which n
occurs are larger than n. For each LA-formula ϕ, let pϕq be the nu-
meral for the Go¨del number of ϕ. Let {ϕk}k∈ω be the repetition-free
effective sequence of all formulas arranged in ascending order of Go¨del
numbers. We assume that if ϕk is a subformula of ϕl, then k ≤ l.
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We say a formula PrT (x) is a provability predicate of T if for any
n ∈ ω, PA ⊢ PrT (n) if and only if n is the Go¨del number of some T -
provable formula. We fix a primitive recursive formula ProofT (x, y)
which is a natural formalization of the relation “y is a T -proof of
a formula x” with the usual adequate properties. We may assume
PA ⊢ ∀x∀y(ProofT (x, y) → x ≤ y). Let ProvT (x) be the formula
∃yProofT (x, y). Then ProvT (x) is a provability predicate of T sat-
isfying several familiar conditions such as PA ⊢ ProvT (pϕ → ψq) →
(ProvT (pϕq)→ ProvT (pψq)) and PA ⊢ ProvT (pϕq)→ ProvT (pProvT (pϕq)q).
Let ConT be the sentence ¬ProvT (p0 = 1q) expressing the consistency
of T . We say a formula PrfT (x, y) is a proof predicate of T if PrfT (x, y)
satisfies the following conditions:
1. PrfT (x, y) is primitive recursive,
2. PA ⊢ ∀x(ProvT (x)↔ ∃yPrfT (x, y)),
3. for any n ∈ ω and formula ϕ, N |= ProofT (pϕq, n)↔ PrfT (pϕq, n),
4. PA ⊢ ∀x∀x′∀y(PrfT (x, y) ∧ PrfT (x
′, y)→ x = x′).
Here N is the standard model of arithmetic. The last clause means
that our proof predicates are single conclusion ones. Our formula
ProofT (x, y) is one of proof predicates of T . For each proof predicate
PrfT (x, y) of T , the Σ1 formula
∃y(PrfT (x, y) ∧ ∀z ≤ y¬PrfT (¬(x), z))
is said to be the Rosser provability predicate of PrfT (x, y) or a Rosser
provability predicate of T , where ¬(x) is a term corresponding to a
primitive recursive function calculating the Go¨del number of ¬ϕ from
the Go¨del number of a formula ϕ. Each Rosser provability predicate of
T is a provability predicate of T . Also the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.2. Let PrRT (x) be a Rosser provability predicate of T
and ϕ be any formula. If T ⊢ ¬ϕ, then T ⊢ ¬PrRT (pϕq).
As a consequence of Proposition 2.2, we have T ⊢ ¬PrRT (p0 = 1q).
Let PrT (x) be any provability predicate of T . A mapping f from
the set of all modal formulas to the set of all LA-sentences is said
to be an arithmetical interpretation based on PrT (x) if f satisfies the
following conditions:
1. f(⊥) is 0 = 1,
2. f commutes with each propositional connective,
3. f(A) is PrT (pf(A)q).
The set PL(PrT ) = {A : A is a modal formula and for all arith-
metical interpretations f based on PrT (x), T ⊢ f(A)} is called the
provability logic of PrT (x). One of the major achievements of the in-
vestigation of provability logics is Solovay’s arithmetical completeness
theorem (see [2, 18, 19]).
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Theorem 2.3 (Solovay’s arithmetical completeness theorem for GL).
If T is Σ1-sound, then PL(ProvT ) = GL.
Provability logics of nonstandard provability predicates have been
also studied by many authors. Feferman [4] found a nonstandard Σ2
provability predicate PrFT (x) such that KD ⊆ PL(Pr
F
T ) (see also [12,
20]). Shavrukov [17] found a Feferman-like Σ2 provability predicate
whose provability logic is exactly KD+p→ ((q → q)∨p). Also
it was proved in [9, 10] that for each L ∈ {K} ∪ {K + (np → p) →
p : n ≥ 2}, there exists a Σ2 provability predicate PrT (x) of T such
that PL(PrT ) is precisely L (The modal logics K+(
np→ p)→ p
for n ≥ 2 were introduced by Sacchetti [15]).
In this paper, we are interested in the provability logics PL(PrRT )
of Rosser provability predicates PrRT (x). In particular, we study the
situation where PL(PrRT ) is a normal modal logic. We introduce the
following terminology.
Definition 2.4. A Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) of T is normal
if PL(PrRT ) is a normal modal logic.
It is easy to show the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5. For any Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) of T ,
the following are equivalent:
1. PrRT (x) is normal.
2. KD ⊆ PL(PrRT ).
3. T ⊢ PrRT (pϕ → ψq) → (Pr
R
T (pϕq) → Pr
R
T (pψq)) for all sentences
ϕ and ψ.
We can define a Rosser provability predicate which is not normal by
using modal logical results of Guaspari and Solovay [5] or Shavrukov
[16]. On the other hand, Arai [1] defined a normal Rosser provability
predicate (This was also mentioned by Shavrukov [16]). Thus whether
Pr
R
T (x) is normal or not depends on the choice of Pr
R
T (x). Model the-
oretic properties of normal Rosser provability predicates were investi-
gated by Kikuchi and Kurahashi [7].
We say an LA-formula ϕ is propositionally atomic if it is not a
Boolean combination of proper subformulas of ϕ. We prepare a new
propositional variable pϕ for each propositionally atomic formula ϕ.
Then there exists a primitive recursive injection I from LA-formulas
to propositional formulas satisfying the following conditions:
1. I(ϕ) ≡ pϕ for each propositionally atomic ϕ,
2. I commutes with every propositional connective.
Let X be any finite set of LA-formulas. We say X is propositionally
satisfiable if the set I(X) = {I(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ X} of propositional formulas
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is satisfiable. An LA-formula ψ is said to be a tautological consequence
(t.c.) of X if I(ψ) is a tautological consequence of I(X). The above
definitions are formalized in PA, and PA can prove several familiar
facts about them. For instance, PA proves that “If X ∪ {ϕ} is not
propositionally satisfiable for a finite set X of formulas and a formula
ϕ, then ¬ϕ is a t.c. of X .” Define PT,n to be the finite set {ϕ : N |=
∃y ≤ nProofT (pϕq, y)} of formulas. Then PA proves “If a formula ϕ
is a t.c. of PT,n for some n, then ϕ is provable in T ”, and so on.
3 The arithmetical completeness theorem
for KD
In this section, we prove that there exists a normal Rosser provability
predicate of T whose provability logic is exactly the modal logic KD.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a Rosser provability predicate PrRg (x) of
T such that the following conditions hold:
1. (Arithmetical soundness) For any modal formula A, if KD ⊢ A,
then T ⊢ f(A) for any arithmetical interpretation f based on
Pr
R
g (x). In particular, Pr
R
g (x) is normal.
2. (Uniform arithmetical completeness) There exists an arithmetical
interpretation f based on PrRg (x) such that for any modal formula
A, KD ⊢ A if and only if T ⊢ f(A).
Let W = ω \ {0}. First, we define a primitive recursive function
h(x) by using the recursion theorem as follows:
• h(0) = 0,
• h(m+1) =


i if h(m) = 0 & i 6= 0
& i = min{j ∈W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of PT,m},
h(m) if h(m) 6= 0 or no i as above exists.
Here S(x) is the Σ1 formula ∃v(h(v) = x). The sentence S(j) is propo-
sitionally atiomic because it is an existential sentence. Suppose that
PT,m is propositionally satisfiable and ¬S(j) is a t.c. of PT,m. Then
there exists a formula ϕ ∈ PT,m containing S(j) as a subformula.
Hence j ≤ m. Thus {j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of PT,m} 6= ∅ if and
only if there exists j ≤ m such that ¬S(j) is a t.c. of PT,m. No-
tice that this equivalence also holds when PT,m is not propositionally
satisfiable. From this observation, for each m, whether {j ∈ W :
¬S(j) is a t.c. of PT,m} is empty or not can be primitive recursively
determined. This guarantees that h is a primitive recursive function.
By the definition of the function h, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2.
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1. PA ⊢ ∀v∀x(h(v) = x ∧ x 6= 0→ ∀u ≥ v h(u) = x).
2. PA ⊢ ∀x∀y(0 < x < y ∧ S(x)→ ¬S(y)).
3. The sentences ¬ConT , ∃x(ProvT (p¬S(x˙)q)∧x 6= 0) and ∃x(S(x)∧
x 6= 0) are equivalent in PA.
4. For any i 6= 0, T 0 ¬S(i).
Proof. 1 is proved by induction in PA. 2 follows from 1 immediately.
3. PA ⊢ ¬ConT → ∃x(ProvT (p¬S(x˙)q) ∧ x 6= 0) is obvious.
We prove PA ⊢ ∃x(ProvT (p¬S(x˙)q) ∧ x 6= 0) → ∃x(S(x) ∧ x 6= 0).
We work in PA: Suppose ¬S(i) is provable in T for i 6= 0. Then ¬S(i)
is contained in PT,m for some m. In this case, ¬S(i) is a t.c. of PT,m.
Hence {j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of PT,n} is not empty for some n. For
the least such n, h(n+ 1) 6= 0.
We prove PA ⊢ ∃x(S(x)∧x 6= 0)→ ¬ConT . We reason in PA: Sup-
pose S(i) holds and i 6= 0. Then there existsm such that h(m) = 0 and
h(m+ 1) = i. In this case, i = min{j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of PT,m},
and hence ¬S(i) is a t.c. of PT,m. Then ¬S(i) is provable in T . On
the other hand, the sentence S(i) is provable in T because it is a true
Σ1 sentence. Therefore T is inconsistent.
4. Suppose T ⊢ ¬S(i) for some i 6= 0. Then PA ⊢ ∃x(ProvT (p¬S(x˙)q)∧
x 6= 0). By 3, PA ⊢ ¬ConT . This contradicts the consistency of T .
Thus T 0 ¬S(i). ❑
Let {Ak}k∈ω be a primitive recursive enumeration of all modal
formulas that are not provable in KD. From each Ak, we can primitive
recursively construct a finite serial Kripke modelMk = (Wk,≺k,k) in
which Ak is not valid by Theorem 2.1. We may assume thatWk andWl
for k 6= l are pairwise disjoint sets of natural numbers and
⋃
k∈ωWk =
ω\{0} =W . We define an infinite Kripke modelM = (W,≺,) which
can be primitive recursively represented in PA as follows:
1. x ≺ y if and only if for some k ∈ ω, x, y ∈Wk and x ≺k y,
2. x  p if and only if for some k ∈ ω, x ∈Wk and x k p.
For each i ∈ W , the set {j ∈ W : i ≺ j} is finite and nonempty
because the Kripke model M is a disjoint union of finite serial Kripke
models. We can use the sentence
∨
i≺j S(j) which contains at least one
disjunct.
We define a primitive recursive function g(x) which enumerates all
theorems of T . The definition of g consists of Procedures 1 and 2. The
definition starts with Procedure 1 and the values of g(0), g(1), . . . are
defined by referring to the values of the function h in stages. The first
time h(m + 1) 6= 0, the construction of g is switched to Procedure 2.
In Procedure 2, g outputs all formulas in stages.
We start defining the function g. In the definition of g, we identify
each formula with its Go¨del number.
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Procedure 1.
Stage 1.m:
• If h(m+ 1) = 0, then
g(m) =
{
ϕ if m is a proof of ϕ in T, that is, ProofT (pϕq,m) holds,
0 m is not a proof of any formula in T.
Go to Stage 1.(m+ 1).
• If h(m+ 1) 6= 0, then go to Procedure 2.
Procedure 2.
Letm be the smallest number such that h(m+1) 6= 0. Let i = min{j ∈
W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of PT,m} and let X be the finite set PT,m−1 ∪{∨
i≺j S(j)
}
of formulas. Then i = h(m + 1). Let {ϕk}k∈ω be the
sequence of all formulas introduced in Section 2.
We define the values of g(m), g(m+1), . . . and the numbers {tk}k∈ω
simultaneously in stages. Let t0 = 0.
Stage 2.k: We distinguish the following three cases C1, C2 and C3.
C1 If ϕk is a t.c. of X , then let g(m+ tk) = ϕk and tk+1 = tk + 1.
C2 If ϕk is not a t.c. of X and ¬ϕk is a t.c. of X , then let g(m+ tk) =
¬ϕk, g(m+ tk + 1) = ϕk and tk+1 = tk + 2.
C3 If neither ϕk nor ¬ϕk is a t.c. of X , then for each 0 ≤ s ≤ m, let
g(m+ tk + s) =
m−s︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬ · · · ¬ϕk and tk+1 = tk +m+ 1.
Go to stage 2.(k + 1).
The definition of g has just been finished. Let Prfg(x, y) be the
primitive recursive formula x = g(y)∧Fml(x), where Fml(x) is a natu-
ral primitive recursive representation of “x is an LA-formula”. Also
let Prg(x) and Pr
R
g (x) be the formula ∃yPrfg(x, y) and the Rosser
provability predicate of Prfg(x, y), respectively. Actually, our formula
Prfg(x, y) is a proof predicate of T .
Lemma 3.3.
1. PA ⊢ ∀x(ProvT (x)↔ Prg(x)).
2. For any n ∈ ω and formula ϕ, N |= ProofT (pϕq, n)↔ Prfg(pϕq, n).
Proof. 1. It is clear that ¬∃x(S(x)∧x 6= 0)→ ∀x(ProvT (x)↔ Prg(x))
is proved in PA by the definition of g. Also PA ⊢ ∃x(S(x) ∧ x 6= 0)→
∀x(Prg(x) ↔ Fml(x)) because each formula ϕk is output at Stage 2.k
in Procedure 2. Since PA ⊢ ¬ConT → ∀x(ProvT (x) ↔ Fml(x)), we
have PA ⊢ ∃x(S(x) ∧ x 6= 0) → ∀x(ProvT (x) ↔ Prg(x)) by Lemma
3.2.3. Thus we obtain PA ⊢ ∀x(ProvT (x)↔ Prg(x)).
2. By Lemma 3.2.3, ¬∃x(S(x) ∧ x 6= 0) is true in N. Then
ProofT (pϕq, n) and Prfg(pϕq, n) are equivalent in N by the definition
of g. ❑
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Lemma 3.4. Let ψ be a formula. Then the following statement is
provable in PA:
“Let i and m be such that h(m) = 0 and h(m + 1) = i. Let X =
PT,m−1 ∪
{∨
i≺j S(j)
}
.
1. For each j0 ≻ i, ¬S(j0) is not a t.c. of X.
2. X is propositionally satisfiable.
3. If a formula ϕ is a t.c. of X, then PrRg (pϕq) holds.
4. If ψ is not a t.c. of X, then ¬PrRg (pψq) holds. ”
Proof. We reason in PA. Let i, m and X be as in the lemma. Then
i = min{j ∈W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of PT,m}.
1. Suppose that ¬S(j0) is a t.c. of X for some j0 ≻ i. Then∨
i≺j S(j)→ ¬S(j0) is a t.c. of PT,m−1. Since S(j0) →
∨
i≺j S(j) is a
tautology, S(j0)→ ¬S(j0) is also a t.c. of PT,m−1. This means ¬S(j0)
is a t.c. of PT,m−1. Then {j ∈ W : ¬S(j) is a t.c. of PT,m−1} is not
empty, and hence h(m) 6= 0. This is a contradiction. Therefore ¬S(j0)
is not a t.c. of X .
2. Since ≺ is serial, there exists at least one j0 such that j0 ≻ i.
Then X ∪ {S(j0)} is propositionally satisfiable by 1. It follows that X
is propositionally satisfiable.
3. Suppose ϕ is a t.c. of X . For the enumeration {ϕk}k∈ω used in
the definition of g, let ϕ = ϕk. Then g(m+ tk) = ϕ by C1. We prove
that g does not output ¬ϕ before Stage 2.k. Since X is propositionally
satisfiable by 2, ¬ϕ /∈ X . Hence ¬ϕ /∈ PT,m−1. Therefore ¬ϕ /∈
{g(0), . . . , g(m− 1)} because the construction of g executes Procedure
1 before Stage 1.m.
Since for each k′ < k, ¬ϕ = ¬ϕk is neither ϕk′ nor ¬ϕk′ , ¬ϕ is not
output via C1 nor via C2 before Stage 2.k. Also let ϕl be a formula
obtained by deleting zero or more leading negation symbols ¬ from ϕ.
Then l ≤ k and exactly one of ϕl and ¬ϕl is a t.c. of X . Thus ¬ϕ is
not output via C3 at Stage 2.l.
Therefore ¬ϕ /∈ {g(m), . . . , g(m+ tk)}, and thus Pr
R
g (pϕq) holds.
4. Suppose that ψ is not a t.c. of X . Then ψ /∈ {g(0), . . . , g(m−1)}
since ψ is not contained in X . We distinguish the following two cases.
• Case 1: ¬ψ is a t.c. of X . Let ψ = ϕk. Then g(m+ tk) = ¬ψ by
C2. We prove that ψ is not output before Stage 2.k.
Since ψ 6= ϕk′ for all k′ < k, ψ is not output by C1 before Stage
2.k. If ψ is not a negated formula, then ψ is not output via C2
nor via C3 before Stage 2.k.
We assume that ψ is of the form ¬ϕl for some l < k. Then ϕl is
a t.c. of X . Hence g(m+ tl) = ϕl by C1, and ψ is not output at
Stage 2.l. For each l′ < l, ψ = ¬ϕl is neither ϕl′ nor ¬ϕl′ , so ψ
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is not output by C2 before Stage 2.l. Also let ϕp be a formula
obtained by deleting zero or more leading ¬’s from ϕl, then p ≤ l
and exactly one of ϕp and ¬ϕp is a t.c. of X . Hence g does not
output ψ by C3 at Stage 2.p. Thus ψ is not output via C2 nor
via C3 before Stage 2.k.
We conclude that ψ /∈ {g(m), . . . , g(m+tk)}. Therefore Pr
R
g (pψq)
does not hold.
• Case 2: ¬ψ is not a t.c. of X . Let ϕk be the formula obtained
by deleting all leading ¬’s from ψ. Then ψ cannot be obtained
by adding ¬’s to ϕp for all p < k. Hence g does not output ψ
before Stage 2.k by the definition of g. Since neither ϕk nor ¬ϕk
is a t.c. of X , g(m + tk + s) =
m−s︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬ · · · ¬ϕk for 0 ≤ s ≤ m by
C3. Let n be the number of deleted negation symbols from ψ.
Notice that ¬S(i) is not a t.c. of PT,n by Lemma 3.2.4 (because
n is standard). Hence m > n holds. Thus for s = m − n − 1,
g(m+tk+s) = ¬ψ and g(m+tk+s+1) = ψ. Therefore Pr
R
g (pψq)
does not hold.
❑
Lemma 3.5. Let i, k ∈W and suppose i ≺ k.
1. PA ⊢ S(i)→ PrRg
(
p
∨
i≺j S(j)q
)
.
2. PA ⊢ S(i)→ ¬PrRg (p¬S(k)q).
Proof. Suppose i ≺ k. We reason in PA + S(i): Let m be such that
h(m) = 0 and h(m+ 1) = i. Let X = PT,m−1 ∪
{∨
i≺j S(j)
}
.
Since
∨
i≺j S(j) is a t.c. of X , Pr
R
g
(
p
∨
i≺j S(j)q
)
holds by Lemma
3.4.3. Also ¬S(k) is not a t.c. of X by Lemma 3.4.1. Therefore
¬PrRg (p¬S(k)q) holds by Lemma 3.4.4 (because ¬S(k) is standard).
❑
Lemma 3.6. For any ϕ and ψ, PA ⊢ PrRg (pϕ→ ψq)→ (Pr
R
g (pϕq)→
Pr
R
g (pψq)).
Proof. Since PA + ConT ⊢ ProvT (pϕq) → ¬ProvT (p¬ϕq), we have
PA + ConT ⊢ Prg(pϕq) → ¬Prg(p¬ϕq) by Lemma 3.3. Thus PA +
ConT ⊢ Prg(pϕq)↔ Pr
R
g (pϕq). It follows that PA+ ConT ⊢ Pr
R
g (pϕ→
ψq)→ (PrRg (pϕq)→ Pr
R
g (pψq)).
Then it suffices to prove PA+¬ConT ⊢ Pr
R
g (pϕ→ ψq)→ (Pr
R
g (pϕq)→
Pr
R
g (pψq)). We work in PA + ¬ConT : By Lemma 3.2.3, there exists
i 6= 0 such that S(i) holds. Then there exists m such that h(m) = 0
and h(m+ 1) = i. Let X = PT,m−1 ∪
{∨
i≺j S(j)
}
.
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Suppose PrRg (pϕ → ψq) and Pr
R
g (pϕq). Then ϕ → ψ and ϕ are
t.c.’s of X by Lemma 3.4.4 (because ϕ → ψ and ϕ are standard).
Hence ψ is also a t.c. of X . We conclude PrRg (pψq) by Lemma 3.4.3.
❑
Define f to be the arithmetical interpretation based on PrRg (x) by
f(p) ≡ ∃x(S(x) ∧ x 6= 0 ∧ x  ppq) for each propositional variable p.
Lemma 3.7. Let i ∈ W and A be any modal formula.
1. If i  A, then PA ⊢ S(i)→ f(A).
2. If i 1 A, then PA ⊢ S(i)→ ¬f(A).
Proof. We prove 1 and 2 simultaneously by induction on the construc-
tion of A. We give a proof only for the case that A is of the form
B.
1. Suppose i  B. Then for any j ≻ i, j  B. By in-
duction hypothesis, PA ⊢
∨
i≺j S(j) → f(B). By Lemmas 3.3 and
3.6, PA ⊢ PrRg
(
p
∨
i≺j S(j)q
)
→ PrRg (pf(B)q). Since PA ⊢ S(i) →
Pr
R
g
(
p
∨
i≺j S(j)q
)
by Lemma 3.5, we obtain PA ⊢ S(i)→ f(B).
2. Suppose i 1 B. Then there exists j ∈ W such that i ≺ j and
j 1 B. By induction hypothesis, we have PA ⊢ S(j) → ¬f(B). By
Lemmas 3.3 and 3.6, PA ⊢ ¬PrRg (p¬S(j)q)→ ¬Pr
R
g (pf(B)q). Since i ≺
j, we obtain PA ⊢ S(i) → ¬PrRg (p¬S(j)q) by Lemma 3.5. Therefore
PA ⊢ S(i)→ ¬f(B). ❑
We finish the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
1. Proposition 2.5 indicates that arithmetical soundness follows
from Lemmas 3.3 and 3.6.
2. Suppose KD 0 A. Then there exists i ∈ W such that i 1 A. By
Lemma 3.7, PA ⊢ S(i)→ ¬f(A). Since T 0 ¬S(i) by Lemma 3.2.4, we
obtain T 0 f(A). ❑
Notice that our arithmetical interpretation f maps each proposi-
tional variable to a Σ1 sentence. We say such an arithmetical interpre-
tation a Σ1 arithmetical interpretation. Then we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.8. Let A be any modal formula. The following are equiv-
alent:
1. KD ⊢ A.
2. For any normal Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) of T and any
arithmetical interpretation f based on PrRT (x), T ⊢ f(A).
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3. For any normal Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) of T and any
Σ1 arithmetical interpretation f based on Pr
R
T (x), T ⊢ f(A).
4 Normal modal logic KDR
It is known that the formalized version of Proposition 2.2 is provable in
PA, that is, for any formula ϕ, PA ⊢ ProvT (p¬ϕq)→ ProvT (p¬Pr
R
T (pϕq)q)
(see [16]). Relating to this observation, in this section, we consider the
following condition for Rosser provability predicates:
For any sentence ϕ, T ⊢ PrRT (p¬ϕq)→ Pr
R
T (p¬Pr
R
T (pϕq)q). (1)
We introduce a new normal modal logic KDR.
Definition 4.1. KDR = KD+¬p→ ¬p.
Since KD 0 ¬p → ¬p, KDR is a proper extension of KD, and
hence condition (1) is not valid for some Rosser provability predicate
by Theorem 3.1.
It is easy to show that the validity of the modal formula ¬p →
¬p in a Kripke frame F = (W,≺) is characterized by the condition
∀x∀y ∈ W (x ≺ y ⇒ ∃z ∈ W (x ≺ z & y ≺ z)). (2)
We say a Kripke model M = (W,≺,) is a KDR-model if ≺ is serial
and satisfies condition (2). Then it is proved that KDR is sound and
complete with respect to the class of all KDR-models (This follows from
Theorem 3 in Boolos [2] p. 89 because KDR is K{(0, 0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 1, 1)}
in the terminology of Boolos).
Proposition 4.2. For any modal formula A, the following are equiv-
alent:
1. KDR ⊢ A.
2. A is valid in all KDR-models.
Here we give an alternative axiomatization of KDR.
Definition 4.3.
1. Let KR = K+¬p→ ¬p.
2. Let KR+ be the logic obtained by adding the inference rule
A
A
to KR.
Proposition 4.4. For any modal formula A, the following are equiv-
alent:
1. KDR ⊢ A.
2. KR+ ⊢ A.
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Proof. (1 ⇒ 2): It suffices to show KR+ ⊢ ¬⊥. Since KR ⊢ ¬⊥ →
¬⊥ and K ⊢ ¬⊥, we have KR ⊢ ¬⊥. Then KR+ ⊢ ¬⊥.
(2⇒ 1): It suffices to show that the rule
A
A
is admissible in KDR.
Suppose KDR 0 A. Then there exists a KDR-model M = (W,≺,) in
which A is not valid by Proposition 4.2. Let M ′ = (W ′,≺′,′) be the
Kripke model defined as follows:
• W ′ =W ∪ {0}, where 0 is an element not contained in W ,
• ≺′=≺ ∪{(0, w) : w ∈ W},
• 0 ′ p; and x ′ p ⇐⇒ x  p for x ∈W .
Then M ′ is also a KDR-model. Since 0 1 A, we obtain KDR 0 A
by Proposition 4.2 again. ❑
In Theorem 4.6 below, we prove the existence of a normal Rosser
provability predicate PrRT (x) satisfying KDR ⊆ PL(Pr
R
T ). From the
following proposition, in a construction of a Rosser provability predi-
cate PrRT (x) satisfying KDR ⊆ PL(Pr
R
T ), we have to avoid the situation
T ⊢ ¬ConT → (Pr
R
T (pϕq) ∨ Pr
R
T (p¬ϕq)).
Proposition 4.5. If KDR ⊆ PL(PrRT ), then for some formula ϕ, T
cannot prove ¬ConT → (Pr
R
T (pϕq) ∨ Pr
R
T (p¬ϕq)).
Proof. Suppose KDR ⊆ PL(PrRT ). Let ϕ be a sentence satisfying the
equivalence T ⊢ ϕ ↔ ¬PrRT (pϕq). Since KDR ⊆ PL(Pr
R
T ), we have
T ⊢ PrRT (p¬ϕq) → Pr
R
T (p¬Pr
R
T (pϕq)q). Then T ⊢ Pr
R
T (p¬ϕq) →
Pr
R
T (pϕq). We obtain T ⊢ ¬Pr
R
T (p¬ϕq) because T ⊢ Pr
R
T (p¬ϕq) →
¬PrRT (pϕq). Assume towards a contradiction that T proves ConT →
(PrRT (pϕq) ∨ Pr
R
T (p¬ϕq)). Then T ⊢ ¬ConT → Pr
R
T (pϕq), and hence
T ⊢ ¬ConT → ¬ϕ. By the formalized version of Rosser’s first incom-
pleteness theorem, we have T ⊢ ProvT (p¬ϕq) → ¬ConT (see [11]).
Thus T ⊢ ProvT (p¬ϕq) → ¬ϕ. By Lo¨b’s theorem, we obtain T ⊢ ¬ϕ.
Then T is inconsistent by Rosser’s first incompleteness theorem. This
is a contradiction. Therefore T 0 ConT → (Pr
R
T (pϕq) ∨ Pr
R
T (p¬ϕq)).❑
We prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.6. There exists a normal Rosser provability predicate
Pr
R
g′(x) of T such that KDR ⊆ PL(Pr
R
g′).
Proof. We define a primitive recursive function g′(x) in stages. The
corresponding formulas Prfg′(x, y), Prg′(x) and Pr
R
g′(x) are defined as
in the proof of Theorem 3.1. In the definition of g′, we can refer to our
defining formula PrRg′ (x) with the aid of the recursion theorem.
For each natural number m, let Fm be the set of all formulas whose
Go¨del numbers are less than or equal to m. First, we define an in-
creasing in i sequence {Y im}i∈ω of finite sets of formulas recursively as
follows:
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• Y 0m = PT,m,
• Y i+1m = Y
i
m∪{¬Pr
R
g′(pϕq) : ¬Pr
R
g′(pϕq) ∈ Fm & ¬ϕ is a t.c. of Y
i
m}.
Also let Ym =
⋃
i∈ω Y
i
m.
Notice that the definition of Ym refers to the formula Pr
R
g′(x). It is
easy to see that for any i ∈ ω, Y im ⊆ Fm. Then Ym is in fact the finite
set
⋃
i≤m Y
i
m because Fm contains at most m formulas.
We start defining our function g′.
Procedure 1.
Stage 1.m:
• If Ym is propositionally satisfiable, then
g′(m) =
{
ϕ if m is a proof of ϕ in T, that is, ProofT (pϕq,m) holds,
0 m is not a proof of any formula in T.
Go to Stage 1.(m+ 1).
• If Ym is not propositionally satisfiable, then go to Procedure 2.
Procedure 2.
Let m be the least number such that Ym is not propositionally satis-
fiable. Notice that m > 0 because Y0 = PT,0 = ∅ is propositionally
satisfiable. Let X = Ym−1. Then X is propositionally satisfiable. We
define the values of g′(m + t) for t ≥ 0 by copying the corresponding
part of Procedure 2 in the definition of the function g in our proof of
Theorem 3.1 with the present definition of X . The definition of g′ is
completed.
Lemma 4.7. PA proves the following statement:
“Let m be the least number such that Ym is not propositionally satisfi-
able and let X = Ym−1.
1. For any formula ϕ ∈ Fm, ϕ is a t.c. of X if and only if Pr
R
g′(pϕq)
holds.
2. Every element of X is provable in T .
3. Suppose for all j < i, there exists no formula ϕ such that ¬PrRg′(pϕq)
is in Fm, ϕ is a t.c. of X and ¬ϕ is a t.c. of Y jm. Then every
element of Y im is provable in T .”
Proof. We proceed in PA. Let m be the least number such that Ym is
not propositionally satisfiable and let X = Ym−1. Then the construc-
tion of g′ goes to Procedure 2 at Stage 1.m.
1. Let ϕ be any formula with ϕ ∈ Fm.
(→): Suppose ϕ is a t.c. of X . Then ¬ϕ /∈ PT,m−1 because
PT,m−1 ⊆ X and X is propositionally satisfiable. By tracing our proof
of Lemma 3.4.3, we can show that PrRg′ (pϕq) holds.
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(←): Suppose ϕ is not a t.c. ofX . Then we can show that PrRg′(pϕq)
does not hold by tracing our proof of Lemma 3.4.4 for ψ = ϕ. The
only difference between the proofs are the following: In our proof of
Lemma 3.4.4, the number of leading ¬’s of ψ is less than m because
ψ is standard, and here the number of leading ¬’s of ϕ is less than m
because ϕ ∈ Fm.
2. We prove by induction on j that for all j, every element of Y jm−1
is provable in T . For j = 0, the statement trivially holds because
Y 0m−1 = PT,m−1. Suppose that every formula contained in Y
j
m−1 is T -
provable. Let ϕ be any formula such that ¬PrRg′(pϕq) ∈ Fm−1 and ¬ϕ
is a t.c. of Y jm−1. Since Y
j
m−1 ⊆ X and X is propositionally satisfiable,
ϕ is not a t.c. of X . Since ϕ ∈ Fm, Pr
R
g′(pϕq) does not hold by 1.
Moreover, g′ outputs ¬ϕ without having output ϕ earlier, and this fact
is provable in T . Thus ¬PrRg′ (pϕq) is provable in T . Therefore every
element of Y j+1m−1 is provable in T because Y
j+1
m−1 = Y
j
m−1∪{¬Pr
R
g′(pϕq) :
¬PrRg′(pϕq) ∈ Fm−1 & ¬ϕ is a t.c. of Y
j
m−1}.
3. This is proved in a similar way as in our proof of 2. ❑
Lemma 4.8.
1. PA ⊢ ConT ↔ ∀x“Yx is propositionally satisfiable”.
2. For any n ∈ ω, PA ⊢“Yn is propositionally satisfiable”.
Proof. 1. We proceed in PA.
(→): Let m > 0 be the least number such that Ym is not proposi-
tionally satisfiable, and let X = Ym−1. Also let i be the least number
such that Y im is not propositionally satisfiable. We would like to show
that T is inconsistent.
We prove that all elements of Y im are provable in T . If i = 0, this
is obvious because Y 0m = PT,m. We assume i > 0. Suppose, towards
a contradiction, that some element of Y im is not provable in T . By
Lemma 4.7.3, there exists the least j < i such that for some formula
ϕ, ¬PrRg′(pϕq) ∈ Fm, ϕ is a t.c. of X and ¬ϕ is a t.c. of Y
j
m. By
Lemma 4.7.2, ϕ is T -provable. By the choice of j, every element of
Y jm is provable in T by Lemma 4.7.3. Hence ¬ϕ is also T -provable.
Therefore T is inconsistent. This contradicts the supposition. Thus all
elements of Y im are T -provable.
Since Y im is not propositionally satisfiable, ¬
∧
Y im is a tautology.
Then both
∧
Y im and ¬
∧
Y im are provable in T , and hence T is incon-
sistent.
(←): Suppose that T is inconsistent. Then PT,m is not proposi-
tionally satisfiable for some m. Therefore Ym is not propositionally
satisfiable for some m.
2. By 1, for any n ∈ ω, the Σ1 sentence “Yn is propositionally
satisfiable” is true, and hence provable in PA. ❑
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Our formula Prfg′(x, y) is a proof predicate of T .
Lemma 4.9.
1. PA ⊢ ∀x(ProvT (x)↔ Prg′(x)).
2. For any n ∈ ω and formula ϕ, N |= ProofT (pϕq, n)↔ Prfg′(pϕq, n).
Proof. From Lemma 4.8, this is proved in a similar way as in our proof
of Lemma 3.3. ❑
Lemma 4.10. Let ϕ and ψ be any formulas.
1. PA+ ConT ⊢ Pr
R
g′(pϕ→ ψq)→ (Pr
R
g′(pϕq)→ Pr
R
g′(pψq)).
2. PA+ ConT ⊢ Pr
R
g′(p¬ϕq)→ Pr
R
g′(p¬Pr
R
g′(pϕq)q).
Proof. Let U = PA + ConT . By Lemma 4.8.1, U proves ∀x“Yx is
propositionally satisfiable”. Then by the definition of g′, the formulas
ProvT (x), Prg′(x) and Pr
R
g′(x) are all equivalent in U .
1. Since PA ⊢ ProvT (pϕ → ψq) → (ProvT (pϕq) → ProvT (pψq)),
we have U ⊢ PrRg′(pϕ→ ψq)→ (Pr
R
g′(pϕq)→ Pr
R
g′(pψq)).
2. We reason in U : Suppose PrRg′(p¬ϕq) holds. Then ¬ϕ is output
by g′. Moreover, since T is consistent, g′ outputs ¬ϕ without having
output ϕ earlier, and also the latter fact is provable in T . Hence T
proves ¬PrRg′(pϕq). Therefore Pr
R
g′(p¬Pr
R
g′(pϕq)q) holds by the equiva-
lence of ProvT (x) and Pr
R
g′(x). ❑
Lemma 4.11. Let ϕ and ψ be any formulas.
1. PA+ ¬ConT ⊢ Pr
R
g′(pϕ→ ψq)→ (Pr
R
g′(pϕq)→ Pr
R
g′(pψq)).
2. PA+ ¬ConT ⊢ Pr
R
g′(p¬ϕq)→ Pr
R
g′(p¬Pr
R
g′(pϕq)q).
Proof. We reason in PA + ¬ConT : By Lemma 4.8.1, there exists m
such that Ym is not propositionally satisfiable. Let m be the least such
number and let X = Ym−1. By Lemma 4.8.2, m is larger than the
Go¨del numbers of ϕ, ψ, ϕ→ ψ and ¬PrRg′(pϕq). That is, ϕ, ψ, ϕ→ ψ
and ¬PrRg′(pϕq) are in Fm.
1. Suppose PrRg′(pϕ→ ψq) and Pr
R
g′(pϕq) hold. Then ϕ→ ψ and ϕ
are t.c.’s of X by Lemma 4.7.1. Since ψ is also a t.c. of X , PrRg′(pψq)
holds by Lemma 4.7.1 again.
2. Suppose PrRg′(p¬ϕq) holds. Then ¬ϕ is a t.c. of X by Lemma
4.7.1. Since X = Ym−1 =
⋃
i∈ω Y
i
m−1, ¬ϕ is a t.c. of Y
i
m−1 for some
i ∈ ω. Then ¬PrRg′(pϕq) ∈ Y
i+1
m−1 ⊆ X because ¬Pr
R
g′(pϕq) is in
Fm. Thus ¬Pr
R
g′(pϕq) is also a t.c. of X . By Lemma 4.7.1 again,
Pr
R
g′(p¬Pr
R
g′(pϕq)q) holds. ❑
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By Lemma 4.9, PrRg′(x) is a Rosser provability predicate of T . By
Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11, we conclude KDR ⊆ PL(PrRg′). ❑
Let F be Shavrukov’s modal logic KD + p → ((q → q) ∨ p)
[17]. It is easy to see that F is included in KD4 ∩ T. Also we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.12. KDR ⊆ KD5 ∩ F. Consequently, KDR ⊆ KD5 ∩
KD4 ∩ T.
Proof. KDR ⊆ KD5: This is because KD ⊢ ¬p → ¬p and KD5 ⊢
¬p→ ¬p.
KDR ⊆ F: Since F ⊢ ¬p → ¬p ∧ ((p → p) ∨ ¬p), we have
F ⊢ ¬p→ (¬p ∨¬p). Since KD ⊢ (¬p ∨¬p)→ ¬p, we
conclude F ⊢ ¬p→ ¬p. ❑
In Theorem 4.6, we proved that there exists a Rosser provabil-
ity predicate PrRT (x) such that KDR ⊆ PL(Pr
R
T ). On the other hand,
PL(PrRT ) cannot include KD5 ∩ KD4 ∩ T.
Proposition 4.13. There exists no Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x)
such that KD5 ∩ KD4 ∩ T ⊆ PL(PrRT ).
Proof. Let PrRT (x) be any normal Rosser provability predicate of T ,
and let ϕ be a sentence satisfying T ⊢ ϕ ↔ ¬PrRT (pϕq). Let ξ be
the sentence ¬PrRT (pϕq) → Pr
R
T (p¬Pr
R
T (pϕq)q). Then T + ξ ⊢ ϕ →
Pr
R
T (pϕq) and T + ξ ⊢ ϕ → ¬ϕ. Hence T + ξ ⊢ ¬ϕ. Then we have
T ⊢ PrRT (pξq)→ Pr
R
T (p¬ϕq), and T ⊢ Pr
R
T (pξq)→ ¬Pr
R
T (pϕq) because
KD ⊆ PL(PrRT ). Therefore T + Pr
R
T (pξq) ⊢ ϕ. By combining this with
T + ξ ⊢ ¬ϕ, we obtain that T + ξ ∧ PrRT (pξq) is inconsistent.
Also let η and γ be the sentences PrRT (pϕq) → Pr
R
T (pPr
R
T (pϕq)q)
and PrRT (pϕq)→ ϕ, respectively. We can show that the theories T + η
and T + γ prove ϕ. Then T + PrRT (pηq) and T + Pr
R
T (pγq) prove ¬ϕ.
Therefore the theories T + η ∧PrRT (pηq) and T + γ ∧Pr
R
T (pγq) are also
inconsistent. Let α be the sentence
(ξ ∧ PrRT (pξq)) ∨ (η ∧ Pr
R
T (pηq)) ∨ (γ ∧ Pr
R
T (pγq)).
Then we have shown T ⊢ ¬α. On the other hand, the sentence α is an
arithmetical instance of a modal formula which is in KD5 ∩ KD4 ∩ T.
Therefore we conclude KD5 ∩ KD4 ∩ T * PL(PrRT ). ❑
We propose a question concerning the logics KDR and F.
Problem 4.14. Are there respective normal Rosser provability predi-
cates PrRT (x) of T satisfying each of the following conditions?
1. KD ( PL(PrRT ) ( KDR.
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2. KD ( PL(PrRT ) and PL(Pr
R
T ) is incomparable with KDR.
3. KDR = PL(PrRT ).
4. F ⊆ PL(PrRT ) or F = PL(Pr
R
T ).
5. KDR ( PL(PrRT ) ( KD5 ∩ KD4 ∩ T.
6. KDR ( PL(PrRT ) * KD5 ∩ KD4 ∩ T.
7. KDR ( PL(PrRT ) ( F.
8. KDR ( PL(PrRT ) * F.
Remark 4.15. Since all consistent normal extensions of KD are con-
tained in the trivial modal logic (see Lemma 3.3 of Hughes and Cress-
well [6]), for any two normal Rosser provability predicates PrR0 (x) and
Pr
R
1 (x) of T , PL(Pr
R
0 ) is consistent with PL(Pr
R
1 ) because they have a
common consistent extension.
In Theorem 3.1, we proved that there exists a Rosser provability
predicate PrRT (x) such that PL(Pr
R
T ) = KD, but our proof does not
guarantee that PrRT (x) satisfies the following stronger version of the
principle (K):
(K’): T ⊢ ∀x∀y(PrRT (x→˙y)→ (Pr
R
T (x)→ Pr
R
T (y))).
Here x→˙y is a primitive recursive term corresponding to a primitive
recursive function calculating the Go¨del number of ϕ→ ψ from Go¨del
numbers of ϕ and ψ. A Rosser provability predicate created by Arai
[1] satisfies the principle (K’). We can make the same comment for
Theorem 4.6, and so we close this paper with the following problem.
Problem 4.16.
1. Is there a Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) such that PL(Pr
R
T ) =
KD and PrRT (x) satisfies (K’)?
2. Is there a Rosser provability predicate PrRT (x) such that KDR ⊆
PL(PrRT ) and Pr
R
T (x) satisfies (K’)?
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